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ContractsEvery firm faces the challenge of leveraging valuable resources in the form of the intellectual assets, know-
how and expertise of itself and others around it. They can only achieve this through interaction with other
idiosyncratically capable firms. But through interaction, resources, activities and actors themselves evolve in
relation to each other. In this situation of complex business interaction and uncertainty, the conditions under
which the respective knowledge and expertise can be leveraged often need to be expressed andmanifested as
joint consent between the involved parties. Designing an agreed platform for using knowledge-based
resources of others poses a real challenge for many companies because the knowledge that firms need to
access is inherently indeterminate and continually evolving. This study addresses this issue by investigating
the role of contracts in leveraging knowledge-based resources. The study builds on an interactive view of
resource leveraging in general and on ideas on knowledge-based resources in particular (Håkansson et al.,
2009). The paper reports on empirical research conducted between 2003 and 2007 that examined real-world
contracts in manufacturer–retailer networks. The study draws conclusions on the role of contracts in
leveraging knowledge-based resources and more widely on the dialectic nature of resource transformation.zas),
l rights reserved.© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction: business interaction and resources
Interaction between business actors appears to transcend inter-
personal discussion or bargaining and is a substantive process
involving the activities and resources of the involved actors (Ford &
Håkansson, 2006b). Through this process, activities and resources and
actors themselves evolve in relation to each other. The ubiquity of
business interaction across the business landscape and the intensity of
interaction in many inter-company relationships lead to the diversity
of the business landscape as a whole. This diversity emphasizes the
importance for each business actor of its relationships with specific
counterparts, each associated with unique combinations of valuable
activities and resources, either within the counterpart or accessible
through its relationships with others. More profoundly, an interacted
business landscape also has important implications for the nature of
business resources (and activities and actors) in that landscape: A
particular resource in such an interacted landscape is not a fixed
entity, but is the outcome of its interactions with other resources.
Hence the use and value of a resource is dependent on the particular
combination and characteristics of other resources with which it
interacts and is combined. Similarly, the nature of a particularresource is the outcome of its continuing interactions with others
over time. In other words, a particular business resource may have
multiple identities in network space and time in the different
interactions in which it is involved.
Each of the business relationships of a particular actor provides an
interactive arena in which the resources of the involved actors can be
combined and developed. Through interaction over time these
resources will follow a particular co-evolutionary path of change
and development for the benefit of the two counterparts leading to
their growing inter-dependence with each other. Further, each of the
dyadic relationships of an individual actor are connected with others
forming a network-like structure that gives access to and affects a
wide array of more or less distant resources. This structure involves
multiple interactive processes through which a particular resource is
confronted and combined with different others in different relation-
ships also produces a tension in the evolution of that resource.
The growing technological and financial intensity of business
operations provides an incentive for companies to limit the
proportion of the resources needed for their operations that they
hold in-house and to increase their dependence on the resources of
particular counterparts. Seeking, developing and managing produc-
tive relationships with multiple counterparts under conditions of
resource inter-dependence, uncertainty and tension becomes a
critical task for managers. This management task is complex enough
in the case of existing physical resources, even though those resources
involve long-term and often dedicated investment and re-investment.
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assessed and their ownership, location and use are relatively clear.
But business relationships are also concerned with the respective
expertise and knowledge of counterparts and how that knowledge is
embedded in multiple activities, resources and individual actors and
in different relationships (Becker, 2001; Conner & Prahalad, 1996;
Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007a, 2007b; Kogut & Zander, 1992).
The dichotomy between ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowing’, suggested by
Cook and Brown (1999), calls for a closer examination of the logic of
interaction as opposed to the logic of possession. Cook and Brown
(1999, p. 387) specify that “[b]y ‘knowing’we do not mean something
that is used in action or something necessary to action, but rather
something that is part of action (both individual and group action)”.
This shares some similarities with the widely accepted distinction
between ‘know-what’ and ‘know-how’ (Loasby, 1999). While ‘know-
what’ is usually understood as information that can be articulated,
stored and disseminated, ‘know-how’ is associated with the actors'
resources or their knowledge to access idiosyncratic resources of
others. The management task for counterpart actors is made more
complex in this particular situation:
The development of a business actor is enabled by the extent to
which through interaction it is able to leverage the knowledge and
expertise resources of counterparts. At the same time, that develop-
ment is more or less constrained in its direction by the actor's
dependence on others (Håkansson & Ford, 2002).
It is howthis process takes placeandhowresource interaction canbe
facilitated through contractual arrangements that form the unifying
ideas of this study. Within the recent business and management
literature exists a growing interest in contracts as repositories of
knowledge and platforms for learning processes (Argyres, Bercovitz, &
Mayer, 2007; Argyres &Mayer, 2007;Mayer & Argyres, 2004). The need
to effectively leverage valuable knowledge in the form of intellectual
assets, know-how and expertise is increasingly crucial because a great
deal of business activity appears to be occurring via strategic partner-
ships, alliances or other forms of inter-firm arrangements (Reuer &
Arino, 2007). However, many contractual arrangements fail to perform
as enablers of resource interaction because of high transaction costs,
information asymmetry or symmetric ignorance of business opportu-
nities. Leveraging the resources of others is likely to require a different
architecture of inter-firm contracting which is open-textured and
capable of integrating complex, dispersed and incomplete knowledge
on a continuing basis.
This paper builds on notions of interaction and resource interaction,
based on empirical research conducted between 2003 and 2007 to
examine real-world contracting inmanufacturer–retailer networks. The
paper argues that inter-firm knowledge is not what companies learn
cognitively, but the indeterminate outcome of complex interactions
over recursive timebased on an agreed set of rules and principles. As the
complexity of interaction increases, companies choose umbrella
agreements as contract forms that balance the need for certainty and
calculability of interaction with the need to remain sufficiently flexible
to respond to unforeseen contingencies and embrace new or emerging
business opportunities.
An understanding of the leveraging of knowledge-based resources
requires us to go beyond the logic of possession and examine leveraging
as an integrative part of the interaction process. Also, an investigation of
the role of contracts canhelp us to understandhowcompanies dealwith
the complexities of interaction and the uncertainties that are involved in
it. Leveraging resources has a re-ordering and re-confirming function.
Leveraging resources is neither pre-specified nor predetermined, but is
subject to joint consent, both tacit and explicit.
2. Contracting and resource leveraging
Capitalizing on the knowledge-based resources of others enables
companies to address problems by transforming aspects of theiravailable resources, activities and themselves (Kogut & Zander, 1992;
Nickerson & Zenger, 2004). Contract scholarship has started to be
concerned with learning and resource transformation (Argyres et al.,
2007; Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Mayer & Argyres, 2004). More
importantly, contract scholarship has started to look at the exact
form or design of contracts and considers contract design as a firm
capability. Contract design capabilities involve learning what pro-
visions to include in a contract and recent has examined critical types
of contractual provisions, such as contingency planning and task
description. This research provides evidence that continuing interac-
tion between firms may lead to greater effort at contingency planning
in subsequent contracts (Argyres et al., 2007). Similarly, studies of
contract design in partnerships in bioscience, fine chemicals,
biotechnology and biopharmaceuticals emphasize the risks of
contractual arrangements and pay attention to the inclusion of
revision clauses, hardship and force majeure clauses and dispute
resolution mechanisms. Studies of contractual provisions in R&D
relationships suggest that leveraging inter-firm knowledge is likely to
continue as long as market threats remain limited and perceived
technological complementarities remain extensive (Faems, Janssens,
Madhok, & Van Looy, 2008).
The growing interest in contracting as firm capability raises three
further issues with regard to the problems in achieving resource
transformation: Firstly, the increasing complexity of interaction
(Argyres & Mayer, 2007; Håkansson & Ford, 2002; Reuer & Arino,
2007; Taylor & Plambeck, 2007). Secondly, the growing information
asymmetries amongcontractingparties (Nayyar, 1990).And thirdly, the
multiplicity of unforeseen contingencies in the business landscape
(Maskin & Tirole, 1999; Tirole, 1999). Complex interaction, information
asymmetries and unforeseen contingencies often lead interacting firms
to seek to explicitly state and manifest as joint consent the conditions
under which knowledge can be leveraged between them.
But designing an agreed platform for using the resources of others
poses a real challenge formanyorganizationsbecause theknowledge that
firms need is “inherently indeterminate and continually emerging”
(Tsoukas, 1996, p. 11). For example, consider the business landscape for
fast-moving consumer goods in which a manufacturer of cleaning
products seeks to access the unique know-howof raw-material suppliers,
the innovative abilities of packaging firms, the creative potential of
advertising and promotion agencies or the scanner data and consumer
profiles obtained daily by grocery retailers. Similarly, each individual
supplier, packaging firm, advertising agency or grocery retailer needs the
unique knowledge of other firms. In this example, companies face the
problemof utilizing knowledge not given to anyone in its totality (Hayek,
1945). Hence, the essence of leveraging knowledge-based resources is
“integration of individuals' specialized knowledge” (Grant, 1996, p. 375).
The utilization of dispersed knowledge through interaction brings with it
further tensions such as the conflict between accessing and acquiring
knowledge. For example, Grant and Baden-Fuller's (2004) theoretical
framework distinguishes between ‘knowledge exploration’ (accessing)
and ‘knowledge exploitation’ (acquiring). This crucial distinction is in line
with other empirical studies (Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996;
Nakamura, Shaver, & Yeung, 1996).
Joint consent matters in this substantive process of interaction
because resources are combined, changed or transformed through
interaction between them. Joint consent between contracting parties is
the “moral component” that distinguishes between valid and invalid
resource transformations (Barnett, 1986, p. 270). In this way, contracts
are manifestations of agreements that specify how resources are
acquired, used or transformed (Schwartz & Scott, 2003; Steyn, 1997)
whilst they establish a “relationof recognition and respect” among those
who decide to participate (Markovits, 2004, p.1417). The use of
another's resources that is not based on a joint consent is not
sustainable. This applies to knowledge-based resources as well as to
physical resources. Additionally, knowledge can be seen as a ‘non-rival
good’; this means that the use of knowledge by one actor does not limit
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joint consentmay lead towidespread and uncontrolled use of methods,
systems, ideas or designs, without reward to originators. Companies,
protect their knowledge as property rights by copywriting, patenting or
bykeeping it secret. Joint consent treats counterparts as actors that bring
‘property rights’ (Foss & Foss, 2005) to an exchange system (Biggart &
Delbridge, 2004) andmanifest their consent (Barnett, 1986) about how
their resources could be used.
3. Barriers and enablers of joint consent
Contemporary business and legal studies indicate the existence of
formidable barriers whichmake it nearly impossible for firms to reduce
important terms of their arrangements with each other into complete
andfinal joint consent (Gergen, 1992; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz&Scott,
2003). These barriers to the creation of a joint consent between
contracting parties include information asymmetries and significant
transaction costs that can involve a) unforeseen contingencies, b)
drafting costs, c) enforcement costs, and d) renegotiation requirements
(Arino & Reuer, 2004; Segal, 1999). These barriers may explain why
some firms prefer not to use contracts at all in many business
relationships (Campbell, Collins, & Wightman, 2003; Harrison, 2004;
Macaulay, 1963, 2004). Many companies attempt to overcome these
barriers by arrangingumbrella agreements, alsodescribed by lawyers as
‘framework agreements’, ‘umbrella contracts’ or ‘framework contracts’
(Mouzas & Furmston, 2008).
The core of this contract form is the observation that the increasing
interdependence among firms means that the primary concern of the
interacting parties is not the detection of deceit or betrayal, but instead
is theuseof knowledge amongfirms to create joint gains (Collins, 2009).
Hence the leveraging of knowledge-based resources is frequently the
product of deliberate contract design that once instituted, regulates
inter-firm relationships by their codes of operations. Thus umbrella
agreements are contracts that circumscribe the fundamental rules and
principles which guide the conclusion of resource transformation
(Mouzas & Ford, 2006). The function of an umbrella agreement differs
from the function of other contract forms that define all the terms of an
inter-firm agreement. An umbrella agreement between related parties
is not concerned with immediate contractual decisions for all future
eventualities. Instead, an umbrella agreement is an enablerwhich spells
out a set of rules that flexibly guide future contractual decisions. Rules
enshrined in umbrella agreements refer to implicit or explicit directions
of ‘expected behavior’ that embody the actors' preferences (Nee, 1998:
p. 87). Repeated interaction between actors leads to the development of
principles which operate as ‘optimization commands’ (Dworkin, 1967).
Therefore, rules and principlesmay limit the types of relationships in
which the actors are able to participate (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). They
act as focal points that help actors achieve a coordination of their efforts.
Based on an informal experimental investigation, Schelling (1960)
defined focal points as a set of mutually perceived expectations, shared
appreciations or preoccupations, and sensitivities. Mehta, Starmer, and
Sudgen (1994) replicated Schelling's (1960) research in a more formal
setting with incentives in which they confirmed that actors achieve
much better coordination if they rely on a set of prominent and salient
points. In thisway, rules andprinciples are focal pointswhichmay guide
interaction among firms (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). They increase the
“predictability” of group members' behavior and give expression to a
group's “central values” (Feldman, 1984, p. 47). A contract as an
umbrella agreement can be used to regulate all crucial aspects of a
continuing interaction and resource transformation.
For example, it may specify and regulate interaction processes,
information systems and enabling technologies, resource combina-
tions as well as performance measurement. The parties to such an
umbrella agreement are not required to specify new terms in their
future interaction nor are they required to refer to the pre-existence of
an umbrella agreement (Mouzas & Ford, 2006). The role of umbrellaagreement is particularly significant in knowledge-intensive interac-
tions where the institutionalization of cognitive frameworks, in the
sense of shared mindset, provides the ‘architecture’ for a continuous
resource transformation (Boisot, 1995; Karamanos, 2003). An um-
brella agreement can, therefore, be compared to discursive institutions
which codify the parties' knowledge about efficient ways to interact
(Sabel, 1994). Discussing the idea of ‘discursive institutions’, Sabel
(1994, p. 138) explains that institutions (such as umbrella agree-
ments) can transform transactions into discussions “by which parties
come to reinterpret themselves and their relation to each other by
elaborating a common understanding of the world”.
Leveraging knowledge-based resources by umbrella agreement
may solve the central conflict between learning and monitoring. In
Sabel's (1994) view, learning is about “acquiring the knowledge to
make and do the things valued in markets”while monitoring is about
the determination by the interacting parties “that the gains from
learning be distributed according to the standards agreed between
them” (1994, p.137). In this way, umbrella agreements can be seen as
‘knowledge repositories’ (Mayer & Argyres, 2004); they represent an
effective coping strategy for not only monitoring what is being done
but also learning what works best (Sabel, 1994).
4. Conceptual framework: leveraging knowlegde-based resources
This section presents a conceptual framework for the study of
leveraging knowledge-based resources. The framework links the
theoretical perspectives together by considering relationships be-
tween concepts contained in a number of different literatures and
attempts to create new meaning. It consists of three conceptual
dimensions a) repeated interaction b) recursive time and c) focal
points, which will be used as analytical bases to make sense of the
empirical findings. We arrived at these conceptual dimensions by
condensing the theoretical background to consider a) substantive
process (repeated interaction), b) time (recursive time) and c)
boundary conditions (focal points). For an analysis of these di-
mensions, see (Ford & Håkansson, 2006a; Mouzas & Ford, 2009).
4.1. Repeated interaction
Repeated interaction between individually significant counterparts
takes place at many organizational levels. It may take a physical form
whenever deliveries, payments, services, learning or other business
developments take place. Each interaction episode will be interpreted,
consciously or unconsciously by the counterparts and by others and
contribute to their reactions (Håkansson & Ford, 2002). The extent of
repeated interaction means that any attempt to leverage resources will
need to be expressed in interactive terms. Understanding repeated
interaction also requires an insight into the various ways by which
actors with different resources, potentials and interests seek to create
joint gains (Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 2001).
Joint gains may be achieved through repeated interactions among
actors who have the ability to see the broader picture and the
connectedness of activities and resources. They require a shift in
actors' self-perception from ‘self as independent’ to ‘self as part’ of a
larger whole (Bigelow, 1992). Companies' openness to move beyond
existing task-specific interactions and engage in heedful and regular
interaction is crucial for their ability to access, combine or acquire
useful resources (Mouzas, Henneberg, & Naudé, 2008).
4.2. Recursive time
The concept of time is not understood here as a linear process but as
recursive practice. The pre-eminence of repetitions and routines,
organizational habits and institutionalized forms of interactions such
as periodic business reviews, task reviews, annual operating plans or
annual contract negotiations among firms are manifestations of
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institutionalization of Electronic Data Interchange among firms as well
as Continuous Stock Replenishment programs re-enforce the pre-
eminence of routines and recurrent events.
4.3. Focal points
Focal points are the boundary conditions or prominent, salient
bearings of mutually perceived expectations and shared appreciations
or concerns (Mehta et al., 1994; Sudgen, 1995). They emphasize
particular aspects of knowing that are important and may divert
attention from other facets of knowing that may not be recognized as
relevant for the involved actors. Focal points emphasize that in a
repeated interaction, the precedent becomes extremely important.
The logic of precedent implies that if a particular problem X is settled
in case C, then the rationale in case C would be applied by later actors
on problem X. In other words, case C sets a precedent in relation to
problem X (Duxbury, 2008). Based on the logic of precedent, actors
attempt to co-ordinate their interactions to their mutual benefit by
drawing on focal points which are salient rules and principles of
mutually perceived expectations. Actors develop rules and principles
because these conventions, operating within a certain space-time,
provide focal points for each actor's “expectation of what the other
expects him to expect to be expected to do” (Schelling, 1960, p. 57).
These three conceptual dimensions circumscribe a platform for
leveraging knowledge-based resources. A platform is not conceived as a
sequence of states (Bunge, 2004; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998) but is
considered as a ‘topology’ or ‘podium’ of factual, physical and social
artifacts where leverage of resourcesmay occur (Johnson & Sohi, 2003).
Our attention, therefore, is focused on understanding the ‘possibility’ of
inter-firm resource leverage. In this way, contracting is a manifestation
of joint consent thatworks by introducing newpossibilities for resource
leverage.
5. Empirical study
5.1. Methods and setting
The present empirical study investigates the role of contracts in
leveraging knowledge-based resources in manufacturer–retailer net-
works in Germany. These networks comprise fast-moving consumer
goods manufacturers such as Procter and Gamble, Unilever, Nestlé,
Coca-Cola, Philip Morris, and Johnson & Johnson, and grocery retailers
such as Wal-Mart, Metro, Rewe, Aldi, and Tesco (Hingley, 2005; Villas-
Boas & Zhao, 2005). Consumer goods manufacturers and grocery
retailers in Germany were chosen for investigation because they are a
significant part of the economy; being the largestmanufacturer–retailer
networks in Europeandgeneratinganannual turnover of€120 billion in
a market of 82 million consumers. Manufacturers have a wealth of
knowledge in theproduction andmarketing of strong consumer brands,
while retailers, with their large number of outlets, have a direct
knowledge of their shoppers.
Manufacturers' knowledge of how to supply retailers and retailers'
knowledge of how to supply consumers does not rely entirely on their
own internal resources. They need the knowledge and expertise of
their counterparts to conduct their own business. For this reason, one
of the most intriguing empirical findings during the initial stages of
this investigation in early 2003was the observation that because of the
economic interdependence within manufacturer–retailer networks,
the primary concern of the manufacturers and retailers was not with
the individual products or services but rather with the continuous
leverage of knowledge and expertise to create joint gains.
The research project indicated that umbrella agreements are seen
by manufacturers and retailers as a strategy to deal with the problem
of integrating dispersed, and continuously emerging, knowledge. This
encouraged closer examination of repeated inter-firm interactionbetween 12 firms to identify how resource leveraging occurred. By
using case study researchmethods (Easton, 1998; Gibbert, Ruigrock, &
Wicki, 2008; Halinen & Törnoos, 2005; Ragin, 1992; Tsoukas, 1989),
the research looks at how umbrella agreements are used as a platform
for leveraging knowledge and expertise in manufacturer–retailer
networks. Forty-eight in-depth interviews and 12 company work-
shops with senior managers were conducted between 2003 and 2007.
The interviewees included business managers such as Business Unit
Directors, Category Managers, Information Technology Managers,
Sales Directors, Purchasing and Supply Directors, Key Account
Managers. The unit of observation that bounded a ‘case’ was the
inter-firm relationship manifested by an umbrella agreement. We
logged our field observations (including impromptu chats and
meetings) shortly after they occurred into a self-devised field-tracking
system. These were entered into a “chronological events list” and
served as a filter or index to the wider set of observations. This was
crucial in the collection of umbrella agreements because it helped us to
carry out a closer examination and triangulation of primary data.
We also made periodic entries into a field diary to supplement the
collection of more formal material about the agreements gathered;
these diary entries also provided reflections on the research as a whole.
We also retained for analysis electronic copies of contract drafts thatwe
received via e-mail. The workshops took place in the premises of
manufacturers and retailers and were supported by senior manage-
ment. The rationale behind these workshops was to encourage and
actively engage informants to become co-producers of relevant
empirical insights. Furthermore, the study of contemporary manifesta-
tions of joint consent was a novel method to move beyond subjective
views obtained through interviews or workshops and examine
objectified inscriptions of leveraging knowledge-based resources.
Data analysis involved critical examination, evaluation, categorization,
and recombination of the data collected to address the research
phenomenon of leveraging resources. Our attention focused on the
relationship between the manifestations and the reproduced patterns of
manufacturer–retailer interaction. These included annual negotiations,
business propositions, follow-up contracts, electronic interchange and
notification processes. The analytical dimensions underpinning the
theoretical framework were a product of identifying knowledge gaps in
the literature, and our initial empirical observationof reproducedpatterns
of manufacturer–retailer interaction.
Using the framework, our primary goal in data analysis was to link
the theoretical knowledgewith the empirical observations. This process
involves “casing”, followingRagin's (1992, p. 225) depiction: “[C]asing is
an essential part of the process of producing theoretically structured
descriptions of social life and of using empirical evidence to articulate
theories…. By limiting the empirical world in different ways, it is
possible to connect it to theoretical ideas that are general, imprecise, but
dynamic verbal statements”. The data analysis of the present research
confined the empirical world of manufacturer–retailer networks in
a) substantive process (repeated interactions) b) time (recursive time)
and c) boundary conditions (focal points) to connect the reality to
conceptual propositions. In the following sections, the paper presents
case episodes and discusses themultiple levels of interface and resource
combination as well as the process and content of contracting.
6. Multiple levels of interface and resource combination
Leveraging knowledge-based resources necessitates a domain
consensus between manufacturers and retailers which is the parties'
agreement over functions and roles in a business relationship. Parties
may lack resources, technological or organizational capabilities to fulfill
certain functions or they may specialize in a certain domain.
Alternatively, companies' capabilities may develop and change and
thus, domains may be disputed and redefined over time. This is
demonstrated vividly in the engagement of retailers in boosting retailer
brands, often referred as ‘private labels’ (Dunne & Narasimhan, 1999;
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attempt by the retailers to invade domains that are traditionally the
preserve of manufacturers, to redefine role-sets and to redraw the
boundaries of domains. It is, therefore, essential to look at companies'
boundary conditions in the sense of shared appreciations or concerns.
Manufacturers need to contractwith a relatively small universe ofmajor
retailers to obtain shelf space for their brands and arrange pricing and
promotional terms. In contrast, retailers are primarily concerned with
the competitiveness of their outlets, the developmentof a distinct image
among consumers, the growth of their own labels, and the profitability
of their outlets. Manufacturers and retailers recognize their interde-
pendence and seek umbrella agreements that pave the way toward a
jointly created knowledge base. This effort requires multiple levels of
interface and resource combination at seven distinct areas (see Table 1):
1) Research&Development, 2)NewProduct Development, 3) Launches
and Re-launches, 4) Category Management, 5) Consumer and Shopper
Insight, 6) Retailer Brands and 7) Joint Investments.
The interface betweenmanufacturers and retailers is linkedwith their
evolvingorganizational resources, for example, key accountmanagement,
purchasing or category management. Umbrella agreements are negotiat-
ed annually at headquarters level, where the historically developed
interface is between the retailers' purchasing departments and the
manufacturers' sales/key account departments. Purchasingmanagers and
keyaccountmanagers arebecomingsophisticated,powerful agents across
different functions; they are experienced, seniormanagers responsible for
the establishment and development of inter-firm relationships and inter-
firm resource combination. Based on their negotiated umbrella agree-
ments, purchasing managers and key account managers interact on
matters such as new R&D and new product development issues; they
arrange product-tests within selected retail outlets or pilot-projects; they
run test-markets for new products and launch or roll-out initiatives
nationwide; they agree about the resources required from both
counterparts such as packaging, trade materials and promotions,
advertising, shelf-space, trade allowances and man-power and decide
about their specific combination.
Purchasing managers and key account managers are involved in the
development of category management systems that involve the
management of whole product categories as profit centers; they work
together sharing knowledge and experience with regard to consumerTable 1
Multiple Levels of Interface and Resource Combination.

































Sales representativesand shopper insight; they make joint investments in facilitating
technologies such as electronic data interchange; and, in some cases,
they take initiatives in creating retailer brands (private levels). In
designing umbrella agreements, purchasing and key account managers
draw on the expertise of other staff departments, such as legal,
marketing, or operations. Exit scenarios, termination clauses or
exclusivity rights, for example, are drafted by corporate lawyers in the
legal department andare usedby purchasing andkey accountmanagers.
The managers who negotiate umbrella agreements are not neces-
sarily the ones who must forge and live with the specific contracts that
follow. This alignment problem often generates internal friction
between different departments or functions; for example, a traditional
friction exists between purchasing and sales managers or between key
account and brand managers. At the regional and business center level,
the interface is between the regional key account manager or sales
director and the head of the regional business center or distributor. At
this level, the representatives of retailers andmanufacturers renegotiate
andagreeon further interaction according to the framework of umbrella
agreements concluded at headquarter-level. The agreed activities will
then be implemented at the outlet level through cooperation between
the manufacturers' sales representatives and the retailers' store
managers. In this way, practical issues such as stock management,
merchandising, displays at the point-of-sale and direct contact with
consumers represent an operational fine-tuning of resource combina-
tion agreed at headquarters level.
7. The contracting process
Having examined the multiplicity of interface levels, let us now
examine the process of how manufacturers and retailers contract to
leverage knowledge-based resources. In the annual negotiations that take
place between September and December, manufacturers' key account
managers contact the purchasing managers of retailers to review the
annual performance of their business relationship. In principle, contract-
ing parties are driven by their interest to maintain and develop their
existing relationship. Contracting parties recognize the value of their
relationship and acknowledge their determination to learn from each
other new, innovativeways to create joint gains. In practice, however, the
whole learning process is driven by a) their particular concerns (focal
points), for example, property rights, retailer/manufacturer brands,
shopper insight, exclusivity or liability issues, b) the amalgamated
know-how of promoting repeated interaction, for example through
information-based systems such Continuous Stock Replenishment or
Vendor Managed Inventory and c) the recurrent forms of interaction, for
example, periodic business reviews and task reviews (recursive time).
For this reason, manufacturers and retailers formulate agendas and
define a range of possible outcomes. Manufacturers' key account
managers ask for the listing of their brands within retailers (shelf
space), offering trade allowances as a fee or payment for the distribution
that a brand obtains (Sullivan, 1997). Because of the critical importance of
this issue, key accountmanagers are often supportedby specialists suchas
business managers or logistics managers (see Table 1). Retailers'
purchasing managers might confront manufacturers' key account
managers with requests or demands for the production of retailer brands
(own labels). Strongmanufacturers show resistance to this temptation by
arguing that this is not is not a focal point of their business policy. Smaller
manufacturers, however, are more likely to consent to producing retailer
brands because by thismeans they can rapidly generate a significant sales
volume without having to pay for trade allowances or expensive
advertising campaigns. Other boundary conditions refer to the instigation
of cooperation in the areas of new product development, category
management and joint investments and increasingly in the development
of consumer and shopper insight. Manufacturers have sophisticated
market research departments and know a lot about their consumers.
However, they know relatively little about the shopping behavior of
their consumers. In contrast, retailers gain a lot of knowledge about
Table 2
A manifestation of consent.
Framework of focal points Contractual clauses
Product range/Services for example, Laundry and cleaning products
Exclusivity Both parties have the right obtain
competitive offers at any time
Information Parties defined three performance
indicators. Mutual notification regarding
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consumer insight that manufacturers have. The interaction process is
driven by objectifiedmeasures of resources andmarket performance. For
example, the market shares of individual brands or items, the trade
allowances that manufacturers are willing to pay, competitive offers and
the weight of retailer brands will exercise a significant impact on
contracting results. In this way, short-term conditions often take
precedenceover thewish tomaintainanddevelopabusiness relationship.all future capital investment and R&D
Electronic data interchange Parties defined an electronic
data Interchange at wholesale level
for logistics and invoicing purposes
Continuous stock
replenishment
Parties agreed a continuous stock
replenishment on the EDI at wholesale level
Category management Manufacturer is appointed Category Captain
and transfers ‘industry knowledge’ to retailer.
Retailer transfers ‘retail
knowledge’ related to ‘shopper insight’.
Both parties will collaborate to achieve
efficient product categories.
Notification Notification regarding product damages
need to be made within two weeks
Subcontracting Subcontracting is only possible upon consent
Assignment All requests need to be made in writing
Verbal requests need to be confirmed in writing
Volume/Price To be agreed/Continuous Stock Replenishment
Unilateral price determination
Invoicing Unless otherwise agreed, on a monthly basis.
Payment in 60 days. Delivery cost is paid by the
supplier (Delivered Duty Paid)
Re-negotiation Annual re-negotiation/business reviews quarterly
Any controversy shall be finally settled by Arbitration
(International Chapter of Commerce)
Force Majeure Parties bear no liability for damages occurred
as a result of war, political unrest, strikes,
lock-outs, and governmental interventions
Guarantee The retailer reserves the right to demand the
elimination of deficiencies or to allow the return
of products within twenty days at suppliers' cost
Liability The obligation to remedy deficiencies apply also
to services obtained from subcontractors
Secrecy All information exchanged is confidential and shall
not to be available to third parties without written
consent of the other party
Property rights No transfer of property rights. Supplier ensures
that no third person has obtained property rights
Saving Clause Unless it is of major importance, invalidity of one
or more clauses will not have any effect on the
umbrella agreement as a whole
Legal venue Zurich/Switzerland
Amendments The supplier has the obligation to revoke
any orders in writing which she does
not wish to accept
Addition Need to be made in writing
Duration Indefinite agreement/Annual re-negotiation
Termination Each party has the right to terminate the
agreement immediately with regard
to a particular type of services8. What is included in the contract
A contract between a fast-moving consumer goods manufacturer and
agrocery retailer is amanifestationof consent that contactingpartieswish
to combinea set of specified resources. This joint consent takes the formof
an umbrella agreement: The agreement starts with the definition of the
scope of business, which includes the listing of types of products or range
of services and moves on to the specification of clauses that regulate the
leveraging of knowledge and expertise to create joint gains. Table 2
presents a collection of twenty three different contract clauses frequently
used in manufacturer–retailer networks. These clauses deal with such
sensitive issues as exclusivity, information flow, electronic data inter-
change, continuous stock replenishment, category management, confi-
dentiality, subcontracting, warranties, property rights, and termination.
They emphasize the importance of repeated interaction because
the use of counterparts' resources is dependent on their particular
combination and characteristics of other resources with which the
resources are combined. A closer examination of the negotiated
contracts between manufacturers and retailers reveals a number of
significant variations. The main variations relate to the existence of a
diversity of possible focal points. Some of the parties are concerned
with the transfer of property rights or exclusivity rights, while others
are more concerned with electronic data interchange and consumer
or shopper insights. Manufacturer–retailer contracts demonstrate a
variety of accepted rules and principles regarding individual freedom
and unilateral action. For example, manufacturers with strong market
shares include contract clauses that confer powers to them to
determine prices unilaterally. Similarly, manufacturers with strong
bargaining power include contract clauses that restrict the retailers'
ability to revoke orders after manufacturers' production start.
These clauses reveal that resource combination is subject to
limitations and parties wish to specify these limitations in advance.
The empirical evidence shows that some umbrella agreements may
restrict or confer powers on parties to vary their initial position or
renegotiate some of their own duties. For example, umbrella agree-
ments may confer powers on retailers to have a continuous stock
replenishment according to consumer off-takes. This allows retailers to
directly accessmanufacturers'warehousing resources for thepurposeof
replenishing their stock. Contract provisions regarding ‘electronic data
interchange’ are considered as enablers of resource interaction between
manufacturers and retailers because they introduce factual (e.g., data
regarding products and prices), and physical (e.g., information
technologies and scanners) artifacts that facilitate a rational resource
combination in the area of logistics and invoicing. Electronic data
interchange provisions are, therefore, drafted in cooperation with the
counterparts' information technology departments. In comparison,
provisions regarding ‘category management’ are prepared in conjunc-
tion with the market research and trade marketing departments.
Consider the provisions for resource interaction between manufac-
turer Nestlé and retailer Rewe in which manufacturer Nestlé is
appointed Category Captain, a term equivalent to preferred supplier.
In this case, manufacturer Nestlé, as Category Captain, will transfer
‘industry knowledge’ to retailer Rewe with regard to a specific category
of products, for example, market research, product specification and
development, consumer data etc. In return, retailer Rewe will transfer
‘retail knowledge’ to manufacturer Nestlé with regard to ‘shopperinsight’ at the point of sale, for example, scanner data regarding
shoppers' buying behavior. Counterparts' quotes illustrate this:
“We know a lot about our customers as consumers; however, we
know very little about these customers as shoppers” Key Account
Manager, Manufacturer Nestlé.
“We have point-of-sale technologies that allow us to gain shopper
insight; but we do not have the product knowledge and marketing
know-how of leading manufacturers” Purchasing Manager, Rewe.
Knowledge-based resources of manufacturer Nestlé and retailer
Rewe were combined based on an umbrella agreement that created
certainty and calculability of resource combinations and enabled
further resource ties between the counterparts. Counterparts' consent
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the umbrella agreement moved beyond physical and factual artifacts
to embrace social artifacts which encourage on-going social exchange
of ideas, comments, suggestions through regular category reviews.
The appointment of Nestlé as a Category Captain was a social artifact
that enabled further adaptations of retailer's point-of-sale resources
in the areas of shelf design, merchandising, and software for scanner
data as well as further adaptations in manufacturer's market research
resources through the introduction of category-based systems.
The impact of umbrella agreements on resources ties is also
evidenced in business arrangements with regard to the exclusive
production and distribution of retailer brands. If this is the case, the
manufacturer will produce the retailer's own labels; the manufac-
turer's resources in production capacities and product know-howwill
be tied with the retailer's resources in distribution. Nonetheless, the
primary concern of umbrella agreements is not with the specification
of specific transactions but rather with rules and principles that allow
resource ties that create joint gains. For this reason, the use of
information technology is regarded by manufacturers and retailers as
a major step towards managing the increasing data flow from the
consumer's decision, up to merchandising and production planning.
This knowledge exchange tightens the resource connectivity between
retailers and manufacturers and contributes to a reduction in slack
and administrative costs.
9. Discussion of results
The manifestation presented in Table 2 shows that the purpose of
contracting is to arrive at a joint consent regarding all crucial aspects of
leveraging the parties' knowledge and expertise in specified areas.
Hence, manufacturer–retailer contracts provide a set of jointly accepted
focal points (Mehta et al., 1994; Sudgen, 1995) that guide the complexity
of repeated interaction over recursive time. Inter-firm manifestations
demonstrate the counterparts' consent that resourcecombination canbe
agreedaccording to apre-existing frameworkand that “it is the intention
of the companies to do so” (McLauchlan, 1998, p. 97). This openness to
learning is regarded as important in manufacturer–retailer networks
because of the high speed at which products are launched, re-launched
and traded (Villas-Boas & Zhao, 2005).
Hence, manufacturers and retailers are confronted with a plethora
of exchanges, a multiplicity of information requirements and an
increasing complexity of inter-firm coordination. For this reason,
manufacturers and retailers see umbrella agreements as an enabler for
combining valuable resources. In this way, an umbrella agreement is a
joint consent that reflects the conceptual dimensions of ‘leveraging
knowledge-based resources’; Table 3 illustrates this. Firstly, the jointTable 3
Leveraging knowledge-based resources.
Conceptual dimensions Joint consent
















Force Majeureconsent defines the basic rules and principles that govern the
substantive process of repeated interaction; the joint consent specifies
reciprocal practices of mutual information and notification, electronic
data interchange, exclusivity of exchange, restrictions applied to
information secrecy as well as product and monetary flows.
Secondly, contracting parties' joint consent incorporates recursive
time by specifying recurrent patterns of inter-firm interaction. This is
demonstrated in the annual or periodic re-negotiation between
manufacturers and retailers, the quarterly business reviews and
periodic meetings. Thirdly, joint consent attempts to articulate focal
points, such as the domain of business, property rights, saving clauses,
guaranteesor liabilities, interactionpatterns, termination rights or ‘force
majeure’. These focal points emphasize aspects of knowing that are
relevant for both parties and set precedents that guide subsequent
interactions.
Inter-firm contracts between manufacturers and retailers reveal
significant resource interdependencies and continuous efforts to create
an ‘architectural knowledge’ (Henderson & Clark, 1990) which
accelerates the integration of heterogeneousknowledge into a ‘common
knowledge’ (Grant, 1996; Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004). In this respect
the role of repeated interaction, recursive time and focal points, is critical.
These three dimensions of circumscribe the substance of a platform
where ‘common knowledge’may or may not occur (c.f. Johnson & Sohi,
2003). Inter-firm contracts may imply a degree of formality.
The formality, however, is not the opposite of substance but aims to
preserve what is important in this substance (Stinchcombe, 2001). A
contract, therefore, is an abstraction of possibility; a refined version of
the substance. This means that the same platform used by different
contracting actors may result in different resource leveraging. The
integration of dispersed knowledge, not known to any single actor, into
a ‘common knowledge’ (Becker, 2001; Grant, 1996; Grant & Baden-
Fuller, 2004) can be seen as the product of continuous and recursive
interplay between knowledge as ‘inter-action’ and knowledge as a
‘possibility’ (Hargadon & Fanelli, 2002).
Manufacturer–retailer contracts reduce the factual, physical and
social artifacts into abstract schemata constructed jointly by the
contracting parties. For this reason, inter-firm resource leveraging
depends on the cyclical interplay between the matter of the
knowledge as interaction and the actors' willpower (consent) that
resides in knowledge as a possibility. In this way, our empirical
findings extend Hargadon and Fanelli's (2002) claim of recursive
interplay between ‘knowledge as action’ and ‘knowledge as a
possibility’ by incorporating the concept of joint consent.
Empirical findings in manufacturer–retailer networks demonstrate
that the integration of dispersedknowledge into a ‘commonknowledge’
depends on the cyclical interplay between thematter of the knowledge
as interaction and the actors' consent that makes knowledge leveraging
possible. In our study, actors' consent is manifested by contract forms
known as umbrella agreements. Umbrella agreements between
manufacturers and retailers institutionalize the cognitive framework,
in the sense of shared mindset; they create the ‘architecture’ that
enables regular and repeated knowledge-intensive interactions (Boisot,
1995; Karamanos, 2003).
The joint formulation of contracts between manufacturers and
retailers transforms transactions into discussions (Sabel, 1994), and
codifies the firms' knowledge about efficient ways to interact (Mayer &
Argyres, 2004). Firms are able to exploit interaction efficiencies because of
their previous investments in time-bound relational assets such as
Electronic Data Interchange or institutionalized forms of continuous
negotiation. This empirical finding is in line with other studies of inter-
firm knowledge transfer. Studies in the U.S. and Japanese Automotive
industries, for example, emphasize the role of relational assets and
distinguish between simple knowledge transfer techniques and techno-
logical capabilities jointly developed (Kotabe, Martin, & Domoto, 2003).
The role of contracts is to codify the firms' agreement of how
capabilities are expected to be utilized and how productive knowledge
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are not simply ‘knowledge repositories’ (Mayer & Argyres, 2004) but
rather enablers of resource interaction that tighten the resource
connectivity between contracting parties. The agreement between
manufacturer Nestlé and retailer Rewe demonstrates this. Actors'
willpower manifested by a written consent acted as a catalyst for
resource interaction and the creation of further resource ties. This was
possible because the umbrella agreement acted as a relational device
incorporating social artifacts. The appointment of manufacturer Nestlé
as Category Captain by retailer Rewe, demonstrates vividly that the
integration of dispersed knowledgewas an achievement that depended
actors' consent that made the leverage of resources possible. Moreover,
the case demonstrates that distribution-resources, such as retail-shelf
and point-of-sale technologies, are not fixed entities, but are the
outcomeof repeated interactionswithmanufacturers' resources such as
product knowledge and market management.
10. Conclusions
On the basis of this empirical study, it is apparent that leveraging
knowledge-based resources is linked with firms' capability to engage
in interaction that generates joint gains. The study examined
leveraging knowledge-based resources as utilization of dispersed
knowledge through interaction (Becker, 2001; Grant, 1996; Grant &
Baden-Fuller, 2004; Håkansson, Ford, Gadde, Snehota, &Waluszewski,
2009; Håkansson & Waluszewski, 2007a, 2007b; Hayek, 1945). In
manufacturer–retailer networks that involve producers of consumer
goods and grocery retailers, companies arrange umbrella agreements
as a contract form under which leveraging of valuable resources may
occur. This constitutes a paradigm change because parties are more
concernedwith leveraging the knowledge and expertise of others than
with individual prices or volumes.
The present study offers three important lessons: First, companies
need to arrive at a joint consent with other firms in order to achieve a
leveraging of knowledge-based resources that is continuous, valid and
legitimate. Understanding the inter-cognitive achievement of consent
requires a fundamental insight into the significance of ‘property
rights’ over resources or ‘entitlements’ which specify the rights that
actors may possess, acquire or transfer in their interactions with other
actors (Coase, 1960; Demsetz, 1966).
Secondly, the conditions under which a resource may be leveraged
need to be explicitly stated and manifested. Even within established
relationships the design of a contracting for leveraging knowledge-
based resources, requires an ‘architectural knowledge’. This architec-
tural knowledge is enshrined in the exact design of contracts between
the involved parties. This study demonstrates that umbrella agree-
ments provide this ‘architectural knowledge’ that specifies the
conditions under which leverage of resources may occur.
These agreements spell out the basic rules and principles of working
together; and, thereby, create a structure that guides resource
interaction. Thirdly, companies' capability to engage in repeated
interaction that generates joint gains is what makes it possible for
them to learn from other firms (Becker, 2001; Conner & Prahalad, 1996;
Kogut & Zander, 1992). Nonetheless, knowledge is not what firms
possess orwhat theyhave learned cognitively; it appears that leveraging
knowledge-based resources is more than a ‘one-way’ process between
the source firm and the recipient firm. Leveraging knowledge-based
resources is rather a dialectic process inherent in a substantive process
of repeated interaction over recursive time guided by focal points.
The study demonstrated that resource leveraging is a complex and
time-consumingprocess. Indiverse andcontinuously changingbusiness
relationships, companies need to balance the need for certainty and
calculability of their interactions with the need to remain open to
embrace new or emerging opportunities. Companies are susceptible to
changes in their surrounding networks and have to interact with other
firms to protect and advance their own knowledge or expertise. Furtherresearch in this area needs to include the investigation of how
companies deal with the inherent complexity and time-intensity of
resource interaction in their particular contexts and how companies see
this issue as a possibility for exploring and exploitingnewopportunities.
Looking at the conceptual dimensions of a) repeated interaction, b)
recursive time and c) focal points further research may explore how
manifestations of consent in different industries become enablers of
resource leveraging; and how these manifestations are impacted by or
impact on companies' own practices of resource combinations.
The pursuit of such research would require the employment of
research methods with the operational ability to a) investigate the
complexity of resource leveraging, b) to handle critically rich data,
multiple sources of information andmultiple interactions c) to investigate
the interaction among organizational actors and d) to capture process
over time. As Coase (1994, p.12) emphasizes “the process of contracting
needs to be studied in a realworld setting”. A lot of econometric aswell as
structural equation models fail to capture significant dynamic processes.
Focusing on real, temporal and dynamic processes, researchers need to
move beyond the use of descriptions of individual experiences (Elsbach,
Sutton, & Whetten, 1999; Tsoukas, 1989; Weick & Browning, 1986) and
consider the study of inter-organizational manifestations such as
contracts, agreements, protocols or correspondence among actors.
Researchers can look at the links between repeated interaction,
recursive time and focal points as reference points and investigate
resource leveraging through inter-firm contracting. In this sense,
business contracts advance our understanding of the conditions under
which this resource leveraging may occur. Building on the idea that
agreements among parties are not instantaneous events but are
progressively reached through interaction over a period of time, future
research could shed more light into the contemporary inter-firm
resource interaction. This is only possible if researchers manage to
escape functional and discipline specialization and search for hidden
links. Further research may increase our understanding of the existing
but hidden possibilities of inter-firm resource interaction.References
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